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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-
Evidence-Searches and Seizures-
Silver Platter Doctrine Abolished
Before trial in the United States District Court in Oregon, Ds
made a motion to suppress evidence obtained through unlawful search
and seizure by state officers. The district judge denied the motion
to suppress since there was no evidence that any agent of the United
States had participated in the search or had any knowledge or suspi-
cion that such search had been contemplated or made by state officers.
The evidence was admitted. Ds were convicted of intercepting and
recording wire communications and divulging such communications
in violation of the Communications Act. Held, in vacating and re-
manding the lower court's holding, evidence obtained by state officers
during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have
violated defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures under the fourth amendment is inadmissible over defendant's
timely objection in a federal criminal trial. Elkins v. United States,
80 Sup. Ct. 1437 (1960).
With this landmark decision, the Supreme Court has closed a
chapter on the controversial "silver platter" doctrine which permitted
illegally seized evidence by state officers to 'be used in federal courts.
The purpose of this comment is to review the progression of signifi-
cant decisions leading up to the Elkins case showing the various
inroads its progenitors have made in the interest of personal liberties.
Four search and seizure situations have arisen under the federal
rule which excludes evidence obtained in violation of the fourth and
fifth amendments: (1) illegal seizure by federal officers, -with use
of this evidence in federal courts; (2) illegal seizure by state officers,
with use of this evidence in state courts; (3) illegal seizure by federal
officers, with use of this evidence in state courts; and (4) illegal
seizure by state officers, with use of this evidence in federal courts.
Until the Elkins decision, only the first three problems had been ans-
wered. Comment, 46 VA. L. REV. 587 (1960).
To show the full impact of the Elkins case, the proper starting
point for this historical development is a description of the influence
that an illegal search and seizure had on a trial at common law. The
judicial philosophy of and practice under the common law manifested
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little attention to the manner by which evidence was obtained in
criminal proceedings. The position was that the defendant had an
adequate civil remedy independent from the trial. DONIGAN & FIsHER,
THE EViDENCE HANDBOOK 185 (1958).
This had been the universal practice in the United States until
the decision in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1885), wherein
the Court held inadmissible the compulsory production of incriminat-
ing papers on constitutional grounds, encompassing the fourth and
fifth amendments. See HALL & GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 501 (2d ed. 1958). Thus a new trend had begun -
the manner of obtaining evidence would be an integral part of crim-
inal trial procedures.
However, it was not until 1914 that the Supreme Court put
forth the exclusionary rule that evidence gained illegally by a federal
officer could not be admitted over the defendant's timely objection.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). This was a judicial
interpretation of the fourth amendment and not a principle explicitly
stated by that amendment.
The Weeks decision solved one of the four basic search and
seizure problems noted in the federal procedures but thereby un-
obtrusively created a problem by holding that the fourth amendment
applied only to federal agents and did not extend to state and local
officers. Consequently, this was construed to mean that evidence
illegally seized by state officers could be admitted in the federal courts.
Subsequent decisions did not obviate this interpretation. Instead,
they encouraged it. In Byards v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1926),
the Court held that whenever a -federal officer even participated with
state officers in searching for and seizing evidence illegally, such
evidence would be inadmissible in the federal courts. This decision
implied that the evidence would have been admitted if the state of-
ficers 'had performed the questioned acts by themselves.
Again, in Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), the
Supreme Court, while expanding the federal exclusionary rule by
refusing to admit evidence illegally seized by state officers solely on
behalf of the federal government, implicitly gave additional support
to the doctrine, which in time became known as the "silver platter"
doctrine. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
The next case of import to this lineal perspective is Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), which presented the question: Does
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the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment make uncon-
stitutional state court use of evidence illegally seized by state officers
in any case wherein such evidence, -if obtained illegally by federal
officers, would have been inadmissible in a federal court under the
Weeks rule? The Court -answered in no uncertain terms that the due
process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment was not
shorthand for the first eight amendments. The Court refused to allow
the due process clause to absorb the federal exclusionary rule by
way of the fourth amendment, which would have obliged the states
to follow it. This case answered another of the four basic problems
-that illegally seized evidence by state officers could be admitted
in the state courts and not be in conflict with the Constitution. See
DAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 936 (2d ed. 1960).
In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), the answer to
another fundamental question was rather clearly indicated. Here, the
petitioner sought to enjoin the federal agent who had seized the
evidence 'under an invalid warrant from testifying in a state court or
from permitting the evidence to be used therein. In granting relief,
the Court held that if the federal agent could flout the federal rules
by using the fruits of his unlawful act in a federal or state proceeding,
the principles and policies developed would be defeated. See DOWL-
ING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 659 (6th ed. 1959).
Throughout the preceding decisions, the Supreme Court carefully
preserved the problem of allowing evidence illegally seized by state
officers to be used in federal trials. But finally in the Elkins case
the last of the four 'basic questions in this area has been answered.
Mr. Justice Stewart, -in the majority opinion, 'ably discusses the
factors motivating the Court in expounding the new rule. He said
that the rule will compel respect for the constitutional guaranty by
removing the incentive to disregard it. Also, conflict between state
and federal courts 'will be reduced, since illegally seized evidence by
state officers will no longer be admitted in federal courts from ex-
clusionary states. Furthermore, he believes the new rule will add
to judicial integrity. No longer would the Supreme Court be an
accomplice to a disregard of the constitutional provision.
It is significant that -four justices dissented. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, in delivering the dissenting opinion in Rios v. United States,
80 Sup. Ct. 1453 (1960), directed very sharp criticisms toward the
new rule. He takes the position that the criteria of an independent
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federal inquiry upon grounds of unconstitutionality would be uncer-
tain and troublesome, to say nothing of the refusal of the federal
courts to extend comity to the states' determinations of what con-
stituted illegally seized evidence. Therefore, he does not believe that
conflict between the federal courts and the state courts following the
exclusionary rule will be reduced.
Nevertheless, 'by the Elkins decision, the pendulum 'has made a
further movement away from the common law practice and in the
direction of more civil rights for citizens under a constitutional
government.
Esdel Beane Yost
Constitutional Law-Navigable Waters-
Extension of the Federal Prerogative
A state agency 'built and operated a hydroelectric power
project in Oklahoma on the nonnavigable Grand River, a tributary
of the Arkansas. Subsequently, the federal government, as part of
a comprehensive plan for power production, flood control, and regu-
lation of navigation on the navigable Arkansas River, constructed
another project on the nonnavigable -tributary at a location for which
the state agency 'held a franchise. The agency demanded compensa-
tion for the "taking" of its water power rights and its franchise to
develop electric power at that site. The Court of Claims held the
government liable. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment, holding that, when the United States asserts its superior
authority under the commerce clause to regulate the water flow of
a navigable stream, there is no "taking" of "property" in the meaning
of the fifth amendment, and, further, that under the commerce power
Congress can treat watersheds as a key to flood control on navigable
streams and their tributaries, and the power of flood control extends
to the nonnavigable tributaries of navigable streams. United States
v. Grand River Dam Authority, 80 S. Ct. 1134 (1960).
The expansion of the navigable stream concept, considered a
progressive liberalization of the commerce clause by many legal
scholars and a malignancy by others, has achieved a growth rate com-
parable to that of the expanding power of the federal government it-
self. A simple statement of the original rule, although outmoded, is
that federal control of interstate commerce and admiralty extends to
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